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_____________ 
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IN RE: ALABAMA AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., 
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_____________ 
 
THE BOEING COMPANY, 
 
                                                           Appellant 
 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1:11-cv-01003) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph E. Irenas 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 21, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and SLOVITER, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 5, 2013) 
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_____________ 
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McKee, Chief Judge. 
The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) appeals an order of the District Court affirming 
the Bankruptcy Court‟s judgment approving the vesting of certain causes of action 
belonging to Alabama Aircraft Industries, Inc. (“AAII”), in a litigation trust whose 
proceeds benefit both AAII and Kaiser Aircraft Industries, Inc. (“Kaiser”), a third-party 
acquirer.  For the reasons set forth below, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.  
I. 
 
As we write primarily for the parties, it is unnecessary to provide the factual or 
procedural history of this litigation except insofar as it helps our discussion.
1
 
 Boeing appealed the Bankruptcy Court‟s judgment to the District Court, and   
Kaiser moved to dismiss Boeing‟s appeal, claiming it was moot under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(m).  That provision of the Bankruptcy Code protects a sale if bankruptcy estate 
property has been sold to a good faith purchaser and the party seeking reversal has failed 
to obtain a stay.  On January 17, 2012, the District Court entered an order ruling in favor 
of Kaiser and the Debtors.  See In re Alabama Aircraft Indus., 464 B.R. 120, 123-26 (D. 
Del. 2012).  This appeal followed.  
                                              
1
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1134.  The District 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Boeing‟s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have  jurisdiction over Boeing‟s appeal from the 
District Court‟s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. Our review of the legal 
conclusions of both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court is plenary.  In re 
Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2012).  We review the District 
Court‟s findings of fact for clear error.  In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 
(3d Cir. 1998).  
 
 
 
3 
 
II. 
 
 Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the “trustee, after notice 
and a hearing, may . . . sell . . . other than in the ordinary course of business, property of 
the estate.”  Section 363(m) then provides that “[t]he reversal or modification on appeal 
of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale . . . of property 
does not affect the validity of a sale . . . under such authorization to an entity that 
purchased or leased such property in good faith . . . unless such authorization and such 
sale . . . were stayed pending appeal.”   
We have held that an appeal of the denial of a challenge of a sale of estate 
property may be dismissed as moot if (1) the sale was not stayed pending appeal, and (2) 
reversal or modification of the Bankruptcy Court‟s authorization would affect the validity 
of the sale.  See Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
Here, Boeing failed to move for a stay of the sale after its oral request for a stay 
was denied in the District Court.  Boeing also failed to move for a stay of the formation 
of the Trust in either the District Court or this court.  Accordingly, the appeal should be 
dismissed as moot if reversal or modification of the Bankruptcy Court‟s sale order would 
“affect the validity of the sale.”2  Id. 
                                              
2
 Boeing contends that the Trust‟s creation is not a “sale” that would benefit from 
§ 363(m) protection and relies primarily on the fact that the Bankruptcy Court‟s order 
described it as a “fair and appropriate use” of estate property.  J.A. at 422 (emphasis 
added).  However, even if the Bankruptcy Court at some point referred to the Trust as a 
“use” instead of a “sale,” it is demonstrably clear that the Court intended the Trust be 
entitled to protection from appeal under § 363(m).  Most notably, the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
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In considering whether reversal or modification would affect the validity of a sale, 
courts must look to the remedies sought and assess whether these would impact the terms 
of the bargain struck by the buyer and seller.  See id.  A challenge to an authorized 
transaction will necessarily impact that transaction‟s validity if it seeks to affect “the 
validity of a central element,” such as the sale price.  Pittsburgh Food & Beverage v. 
Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 649 (3d Cir. 1997). 
In the present case, Boeing asks us to either reverse the vesting of the causes of 
action in the Trust or, in the alternative, to vacate the Bankruptcy Court‟s ruling so that 
the question of whether it was proper to create the Trust can be litigated anew at a later 
date.  We agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that either of these remedies would 
inevitably undermine the validity of the sale.  It is clear that the value of the assets that 
Kaiser purchased would be affected if the contract terms that Boeing challenges – i.e., 
those that entitle Kaiser to 90% of proceeds obtained from causes of action vested into 
the Trust – are either excised from the APA or burdened with the threat of further 
litigation.  Accordingly, Boeing‟s appeal is moot.3 
                                                                                                                                                  
order included language stating that “the establishment of the Litigation Trust, and the 
vesting of the Trust Causes of Action in the Litigation Trust shall be protected by Section 
363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code in the event that this Order is reversed or modified on 
appeal.”  J.A. at 185.  This language reiterates what the Bankruptcy Court had already 
communicated to the parties during the September 1, 2011 hearing and clears any doubt 
regarding the Court‟s intention to protect the creation of the Trust under § 363(m). 
3
 Boeing also claims that Kaiser and the Debtors should not benefit from § 363(m) 
protection because, according to Boeing, they argued that the Trust‟s creation was not a 
“sale” at the Bankruptcy Court only to switch positions before the District Court.  
Boeing‟s argument is grounded on estoppel principles.  This court has recognized that 
judicial estoppel is properly reserved for particularly egregious litigation practices.  See 
Chao v. Roy’s Constr., Inc., 517 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[J]udicial estoppel is 
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III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.  
                                                                                                                                                  
an extreme remedy, to be used only „when the inconsistent positions are tantamount to a 
knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court.‟” (quoting Krystal Cadillac-
Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 324 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
We do not believe that Kaiser‟s characterizations to this court or to the courts below rise 
to this level and find Boeing‟s estoppel argument unavailing. 
